Secure communication devices

[CEO]

This is the ONLY way! 😎

PS. Robert Greene wrote about it in Law 26 of The 48 Laws of Power and is "Keep Your Hands Clean," which dictates using scapegoats (or "cat's-paws") to take blame and disguise mistakes, ensuring your reputation remains spotless.

What about the network level?

As a business owner, what would be the advantage of building your own in-house communication system like the cartel... versus getting GrapheneOS burner phones with decent communication apps like SimpleX?
Let's assume you hire one of those packaged "private cell network" engineers, and they build you two base stations for like 10 grand. Wouldn't the costs far outweigh purchasing burner phones for each employee?

Is the selling point psychological, i.e. a 2G 2010s phone connected to a private cell network has less ways for a braindead employee to screw up in their OPSEC?

The right mindset.

 

[compromised]

The more you do, the larger your attack surface becomes. The larger your attack surface, the more you have to protect. The more you have to protect, the greater the statistical chance something slips through and you get breached.

For most people who are genuinely OPSEC aware, the bar is surprisingly low:

• Use strong, simple encryption where it matters (full-disk, messaging, passwords).
• Avoid leaving a digital footprint when doing anything sensitive or "stupid". You can even throw your phone away if you can bear the inconvenience.
• Ruthlessly minimize the technologies, accounts, and services you rely on.

This approach places you ahead of the vast majority of self-proclaimed "security-conscious" people and will have you run laps around the extra-legal hypocrites.

Too many are actively booby-trapping themselves in the pursuit of flexing the latest encrypted phone, hardened OS, anonymous VPN stack, or obscure privacy gadget. While the examples are in tech, dependencies can also be environmental or human. Every additional black box you introduce is something you don't fully understand: unknown firmware, unvetted supply chains, telemetry you can't see, update mechanisms that could be subverted, or side-channels you never considered. The more opaque layers you stack for "protection," the less visibility you have into your actual attack surface and how well (or poorly) your defenses are really configured.

Security is, and always has been, incorporated on a SOP level. So assuming breach is inevitable (or has possibly already happened). Just live your life accordingly, constantly aware that your actions might be observed, logged, or reconstructed like Jim Carry's in The Truman Show.