🇮🇱❌🇱🇧 — Areas around the town of Sribbin in southern Lebanon's Bint Jbeil district came under Israeli artillery fire, according to Al Mayadeen
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🇺🇸🇺🇸❌🇮🇷 — Photo shared by US CENTCOM shows A U.S. Sailor monitoring flight operations aboard USS John Finn (DDG 113) as the guided-missile destroyer sails in the Arabian Sea and enforces the U.S. blockade against Iran.
📝 According to US CENTCOM, as of Aug. 23, U.S. forces have redirected 70 commercial vessels, disabled 3 and boarded 2 to ensure compliance.
📝 According to US CENTCOM, as of Aug. 23, U.S. forces have redirected 70 commercial vessels, disabled 3 and boarded 2 to ensure compliance.
#BREAKING | 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 — Ukrainian drones reach Arkhangelsk region for first time, targeting strategic facilities near Plesetsk Cosmodrome
Ukrainian forces launched drones into Russia’s Arkhangelsk region — approximately 1,800–1,900 km from the Ukrainian border — for the first time, according to monitoring channels and local reports. Preliminary information suggests the strikes were aimed at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Russia’s primary military spaceport used for satellite launches, ICBM testing (including the Sarmat), and development of the Rassvet satellite constellation.
Russian authorities reported that roughly 40 drones were destroyed over the region. A local official stated the drones targeted “strategic facilities.” Arkhangelsk Governor Alexander Tsybulsky issued a drone alert, urging residents to seek shelter and warning of mobile internet disruptions. No casualties have been reported.
This marks a significant expansion of Ukraine’s long-range drone capabilities into Russia’s far north.
The Global Eye | Subscribe ✈️
Ukrainian forces launched drones into Russia’s Arkhangelsk region — approximately 1,800–1,900 km from the Ukrainian border — for the first time, according to monitoring channels and local reports. Preliminary information suggests the strikes were aimed at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Russia’s primary military spaceport used for satellite launches, ICBM testing (including the Sarmat), and development of the Rassvet satellite constellation.
Russian authorities reported that roughly 40 drones were destroyed over the region. A local official stated the drones targeted “strategic facilities.” Arkhangelsk Governor Alexander Tsybulsky issued a drone alert, urging residents to seek shelter and warning of mobile internet disruptions. No casualties have been reported.
This marks a significant expansion of Ukraine’s long-range drone capabilities into Russia’s far north.
The Global Eye | Subscribe ✈️
Part 2: Willy Brandt's election in 1969 then brought the Social Democrats to power for the first time in the Federal Republic's history, marking a clear break with the political culture of the preceding era, which had been dominated by former Wehrmacht officers, Nazi-era civil servants, and businessmen with ties to the Reich.
Britain's transformation was similarly a break with the older Churchillian conception of national continuity. Churchill's political vision had combined parliamentary democracy and social reform with patriotism, imperial continuity, national sovereignty, and a strong sense of Britain's distinct historical role. By the 1960s, that framework was rapidly losing its political and cultural foundations.
Harold Wilson's Labour governments oversaw the abolition of the death penalty for murder, the decriminalization of homosexuality, the legalization of abortion, the liberalization of divorce, the abolition of flogging, and major expansions of anti-discrimination and equal-pay legislation. Britain was moving away from a society defined by inherited status, imperial identity, religious morality, and social deference toward one increasingly defined by individual rights and personal autonomy.
The same transformation was visible across the wider Anglosphere. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand abandoned their formal white-immigration policies, while the Commonwealth became increasingly hostile to apartheid South Africa and, especially, Ian Smith's Rhodesia. The old assumption that shared European ancestry, Commonwealth ties, and anti-communism were sufficient to legitimize racially exclusive regimes was losing its force.
By the 1970s, South Africa and Rhodesia were increasingly treated as pariahs rather than defensible bastions of the Western order, reflecting the broader collapse of the political assumptions that had once made such regimes acceptable to much of the Western establishment.
The Catholic world underwent a parallel transformation. The Second Vatican Council (1962–65) brought major changes to liturgy, religious freedom, and the Church's relationship with modern society. The following decades saw its social influence weaken sharply: Spain, Ireland, and Italy all experienced major declines in religious practice and the Church's authority over public and private life, while Catholic dominance in Latin America was increasingly challenged by evangelical and Pentecostal churches. The Church was losing much of the influence it had once exercised over family life, morality, education, and public culture.
In Southern Europe, the process was slower but more abrupt. Franco's Spain preserved its authoritarian national framework until his death, after which the transition dismantled the old order. Salazar's Portugal and the successor Caetano regime collapsed in the 1974 Carnation Revolution. Across these cases, closed and hierarchical models of sovereignty gave way to more liberal-democratic arrangements.
Even within the socialist world, the pressure registered. In Yugoslavia, the purge of the conservative security apparatus in 1966, student protests in 1968, denunciations of a "red bourgeoisie," liberal currents in Serbia, and the Croatian Spring of 1971 forced the regime to repress open challenges while later conceding substantial ground. The 1974 Constitution decentralized the federation, strengthened the republics and autonomous provinces, and opened room for expanding minority rights.
The Prague Spring demonstrated a similar appetite for greater openness under very different political conditions. Student protests also reached the Soviet Union itself, though the hard limits imposed by Soviet power quickly reasserted control.
Britain's transformation was similarly a break with the older Churchillian conception of national continuity. Churchill's political vision had combined parliamentary democracy and social reform with patriotism, imperial continuity, national sovereignty, and a strong sense of Britain's distinct historical role. By the 1960s, that framework was rapidly losing its political and cultural foundations.
Harold Wilson's Labour governments oversaw the abolition of the death penalty for murder, the decriminalization of homosexuality, the legalization of abortion, the liberalization of divorce, the abolition of flogging, and major expansions of anti-discrimination and equal-pay legislation. Britain was moving away from a society defined by inherited status, imperial identity, religious morality, and social deference toward one increasingly defined by individual rights and personal autonomy.
The same transformation was visible across the wider Anglosphere. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand abandoned their formal white-immigration policies, while the Commonwealth became increasingly hostile to apartheid South Africa and, especially, Ian Smith's Rhodesia. The old assumption that shared European ancestry, Commonwealth ties, and anti-communism were sufficient to legitimize racially exclusive regimes was losing its force.
By the 1970s, South Africa and Rhodesia were increasingly treated as pariahs rather than defensible bastions of the Western order, reflecting the broader collapse of the political assumptions that had once made such regimes acceptable to much of the Western establishment.
The Catholic world underwent a parallel transformation. The Second Vatican Council (1962–65) brought major changes to liturgy, religious freedom, and the Church's relationship with modern society. The following decades saw its social influence weaken sharply: Spain, Ireland, and Italy all experienced major declines in religious practice and the Church's authority over public and private life, while Catholic dominance in Latin America was increasingly challenged by evangelical and Pentecostal churches. The Church was losing much of the influence it had once exercised over family life, morality, education, and public culture.
In Southern Europe, the process was slower but more abrupt. Franco's Spain preserved its authoritarian national framework until his death, after which the transition dismantled the old order. Salazar's Portugal and the successor Caetano regime collapsed in the 1974 Carnation Revolution. Across these cases, closed and hierarchical models of sovereignty gave way to more liberal-democratic arrangements.
Even within the socialist world, the pressure registered. In Yugoslavia, the purge of the conservative security apparatus in 1966, student protests in 1968, denunciations of a "red bourgeoisie," liberal currents in Serbia, and the Croatian Spring of 1971 forced the regime to repress open challenges while later conceding substantial ground. The 1974 Constitution decentralized the federation, strengthened the republics and autonomous provinces, and opened room for expanding minority rights.
The Prague Spring demonstrated a similar appetite for greater openness under very different political conditions. Student protests also reached the Soviet Union itself, though the hard limits imposed by Soviet power quickly reasserted control.
Part 3: This was also the period in which the dominant narrative of the Second World War began to change. From 1945 into the late 1960s, the story—as reflected in the memoirs of de Gaulle, Churchill, and Eisenhower, early school curricula, and Soviet accounts—centered on victory, struggle, heroism, national sacrifice, and the defeat of a military and political enemy.
From the late 1960s onward, the moral center of gravity increasingly shifted toward the Holocaust, human rights, and a language of universal guilt and redemption. The war was increasingly understood not simply as a conflict between states and armies, but as a foundational moral drama about atrocity, culpability, and the protection of the individual.
The significance of the 1960s, therefore, lies not simply in the fact that Western societies became more liberal, but that they had not been fully liberal in the first place. The postwar decades were a distinct settlement of their own: democratic and welfare-oriented, yet socially conservative, nationally bounded, and confident in traditional institutions and moral norms.
The decisive transformation came later. The liberalization of the West accelerated dramatically in the 1960s and early 1970s. Civil rights, immigration reform, feminism, sexual liberalization, anti-discrimination law, declining religious authority, the transformation of family law, student radicalism, decolonization, and the emergence of a universalist human-rights language fundamentally altered how Western societies understood authority, citizenship, morality, identity, and individual freedom.
The 1950s were therefore not simply a primitive version of the liberal society that followed; they were a different social order. The democratic and welfare institutions established after 1945 created the framework within which the later transformation could occur, but the cultural assumptions of that era remained substantially different from those that became dominant after the 1960s.
The social revolutions of the 1960s thus did more than liberalize Western society. They displaced an older model built around social restraint, inherited institutions, national continuity, and collective obligation, replacing it with one increasingly organized around individual autonomy, formal equality, cultural pluralism, and universal rights. That transformation greatly expanded personal freedom and equality, but it also weakened older assumptions about family, citizenship, national identity, and demographic continuity. Restrictive immigration systems disappeared, traditional family norms lost authority, and older ideas of national distinction became harder to defend in universalist terms. The consequences—immigration, demographic decline, changing family structures, national identity, and social cohesion—would become major political questions in the decades that followed.
The central historical point is therefore straightforward: the West did not go from traditional conservatism to modern liberalism immediately after 1945. The postwar decades were an intermediate order of their own. The decisive acceleration came during the “Long 1960s,” stretching roughly from 1958 to 1975, when the assumptions of that order were progressively dismantled.
The influence of the “Long 1960s” ultimately forged contemporary liberalism and laid the foundations for many of the political and legal narratives that still dominate Western discourse.
From the late 1960s onward, the moral center of gravity increasingly shifted toward the Holocaust, human rights, and a language of universal guilt and redemption. The war was increasingly understood not simply as a conflict between states and armies, but as a foundational moral drama about atrocity, culpability, and the protection of the individual.
The significance of the 1960s, therefore, lies not simply in the fact that Western societies became more liberal, but that they had not been fully liberal in the first place. The postwar decades were a distinct settlement of their own: democratic and welfare-oriented, yet socially conservative, nationally bounded, and confident in traditional institutions and moral norms.
The decisive transformation came later. The liberalization of the West accelerated dramatically in the 1960s and early 1970s. Civil rights, immigration reform, feminism, sexual liberalization, anti-discrimination law, declining religious authority, the transformation of family law, student radicalism, decolonization, and the emergence of a universalist human-rights language fundamentally altered how Western societies understood authority, citizenship, morality, identity, and individual freedom.
The 1950s were therefore not simply a primitive version of the liberal society that followed; they were a different social order. The democratic and welfare institutions established after 1945 created the framework within which the later transformation could occur, but the cultural assumptions of that era remained substantially different from those that became dominant after the 1960s.
The social revolutions of the 1960s thus did more than liberalize Western society. They displaced an older model built around social restraint, inherited institutions, national continuity, and collective obligation, replacing it with one increasingly organized around individual autonomy, formal equality, cultural pluralism, and universal rights. That transformation greatly expanded personal freedom and equality, but it also weakened older assumptions about family, citizenship, national identity, and demographic continuity. Restrictive immigration systems disappeared, traditional family norms lost authority, and older ideas of national distinction became harder to defend in universalist terms. The consequences—immigration, demographic decline, changing family structures, national identity, and social cohesion—would become major political questions in the decades that followed.
The central historical point is therefore straightforward: the West did not go from traditional conservatism to modern liberalism immediately after 1945. The postwar decades were an intermediate order of their own. The decisive acceleration came during the “Long 1960s,” stretching roughly from 1958 to 1975, when the assumptions of that order were progressively dismantled.
The influence of the “Long 1960s” ultimately forged contemporary liberalism and laid the foundations for many of the political and legal narratives that still dominate Western discourse.
🇮🇱🇸🇾🇯🇴 — Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani met Mossad Chief Roman Gofman today in Jordan to ease tensions after Israel's recent strike on Syria's Abu al-Duhur Air Base.
— Axios | @TheWarReporter
— Axios | @TheWarReporter
🇺🇸🤖📝 — US Secretary of Education Linda McMahon:
Use of AI is a balance — it is no different than any other new tool that's introduced in the classroom... Nothing should replace that one-on-one with teacher interaction with students.
💳💳🤝🇷🇺 — Visa and Mastercard will likely return to Russia in the future, according to Anatoly Aksakov, head of the State Duma committee on the financial market.
They will definitely return and compete for the market.
Of course, it will be more difficult, as the National Payment Card System is not standing still and is providing new technologies and opportunities for "Mir" cardholders.
Of course, it will be more difficult, as the National Payment Card System is not standing still and is providing new technologies and opportunities for "Mir" cardholders.
🚩🚩❌🇺🇸👍 —Left-wing and right-wing activists are clashing outside Keller Auditorium in downtown where Hasan Piker is holding a tour stop.
➡️ Katherine Meagan Vogel (woman with the long pink hair), a Rose City Antifa associate who was recently convicted for her role in an anti-government riot at the ICE facility, is in attendance.
➡️ Katherine Meagan Vogel (woman with the long pink hair), a Rose City Antifa associate who was recently convicted for her role in an anti-government riot at the ICE facility, is in attendance.