wtf? yet another self-proclaimed security expert? can't you simply say what's wrong with my question or keep you mouth shut?0xDEADBEEF said:
Absolutely, that's just like taking a crash course in lock-picking and safe-cracking because you've misplaced your house keys and forgotten the combination to your safe, but you urgently need your jewels for the gala tonight.
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Do you have something useful to contribute?0xDEADBEEF said:
Absolutely, that's just like taking a crash course in lock-picking and safe-cracking because you've misplaced your house keys and forgotten the combination to your safe, but you urgently need your jewels for the gala tonight.
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that's basically the root of my question - if any ATM or POS terminal can read the chip what makes it hard to make a copy (or device with the same physical interface) that presents the same dataSols said:
Cloning EMV chips is much harder. The chip itself cannot be cloned but there are some security vulnerabilities that make it possible to trick a POS terminal or ATM. I'm not entirely sure about the technicalities of it. You can probably dig up some articles about it. The gist of it appears to be that EMV chips are still considered generally safe enough, but not as 100% secure as they were initially touted.
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Regarding the ease of cloning magnetic stripes, you're correct. Magnetic stripe data can be relatively easily captured and duplicated. This vulnerability is precisely why the industry has been shifting towards EMV (chip + PIN) technology. Globally there is a decrease in amount of places where there is swiping instead of dipping, so in the 'cool' places this would not be that useful.Sols said:
Cloning the mag stripe is relatively easy. You just need a card reader/writer. First read your card, save the data, and then run a blank card through the machine and encode your data to the mag stripe of that card.
Cloning EMV chips is much harder. The chip itself cannot be cloned but there are some security vulnerabilities that make it possible to trick a POS terminal or ATM. I'm not entirely sure about the technicalities of it. You can probably dig up some articles about it. The gist of it appears to be that EMV chips are still considered generally safe enough, but not as 100% secure as they were initially touted.
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void said:
that's basically the root of my question - if any ATM or POS terminal can read the chip what makes it hard to make a copy (or device with the same physical interface) that presents the same data
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depends on your definition of "legitimate" - from my perspective there is an obvious use case that doesn't involve any theft/scam/whatever illicit motivation - I simply want to use my card in more than one place0xDEADBEEF said:
Regarding my earlier reply, there really is no legitimate reason to clone your card.
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fair enough, I appreciate your constructive response0xDEADBEEF said:
There was a better way to ask, but also a better way to respond to your question. Also I understand the sentiment since there are more areas of expertise than there are experts in security.
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Let's assume you are able to clone the card to use it in multiple places, now approach this theory from the Bank's POV. Even the shittiest fraud systems will employ anomaly detection based on impossible/infrequent travel. You will definitely trigger some alerts that will result in your card being blocked/reissued/investigated. Your bank will not accept that risk multiple times, so you are not even able to get stuck in the cycle of detection and replacement. Better would be to request an additional card, unless there is a specific reason why this is not possible that I am missing.void said:
depends on your definition of "legitimate" - from my perspective there is an obvious use case that doesn't involve any theft/scam/whatever illicit motivation - I simply want to use my card in more than one place
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If you possess the necessary resources, executing an attack on EMV systems will be successful. There are certain implementation flaws that can be exploited for the use case you're describing. As previously mentioned, EMV transactions are dynamic. If you gain control over a POS terminal, it's possible to manipulate the card into generating a new cryptogram, which boils down to unique transaction data that is signed by the card. I was curious about recent developments and this method seems to be used by the Brazilian group I mentioned before. Found a figure that demonstrates the chain of attack.void said:
this clearly needs more study and insight however on the first look I can imagine a specialized terminal that acts as a proxy and communicates with other devices presenting (not simultaneously) the same untampered data to the POS terminal for instance
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